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6 OUR LIFE • November 2022 Photo: @tweet4anna "For each grain [of wheat] in 1933" also examine two key questions that help isolate patterns of genocidal vi - olence from other forms of equally deplorable mass atrocities. First, within the broader field of gen - ocide studies, we examine who was targeted, looking for indiscriminate violence against all group members in genocide (e.g., men, women, and children). Second, we use a variety of research-based “proxy variables” that help us separate the destructive mo - tives of genocide from other forms of (still heinous) harshly repressive vio - lence. As I mentioned, most genocide perpetrators do not announce public - ly or even privately their candid inten - tions, so in the social science field, we look for patterns that indicate these deeper intentions. The proxy variables that I have used to examine the events of the Holodomor include reviewing all records from key architects like Jo - seph Stalin for evidence that Soviet perpetrators could not envision co-ex - isting in the future with Ukrainians, evidence that victims were pursued (showing perpetrator dedication to targeting victims, even to the extent of working harder and inconvenienc - ing themselves), evidence of intensive coordination and systemization, and evidence that the category of “Ukrain - ian” was transforming in the perpetra - tors’ consciences into an undifferenti - ated category of “irredeemables.” Echoing other historical reconstruc - tions that have flagged July-August 1932 as an irrevocable turning point in Stalin and his inner circle’s target - ing of Ukrainians, my analysis also flagged very high rates of genocidal proxy variables from this time pe - riod through the end of 1933. This time period is well-known in histo - riographical circles for stark records where Stalin’s obsession with “los - ing” Ukraine is explicit. For instance, on August 11, 1932, Stalin writes to his subordinate Lazar Kaganovich, on documents from 1932–1933, as we would expect to see the clearest empirical patterns of violence during this chronological climax. When examining the Holodomor case, analyzing historical records from a comparative genocide approach is valuable in several ways. One key debate within historiographies of the Holodomor has asked whether the Soviet government’s grain seizures from Ukrainians can accurately be interpreted within the category of genocide (a question that also impacts the study of other Soviet famines). Yet a comparative genocide studies approach reminds us that, rather than focusing on the method of killing, we must ex - amine the intended outcome. In fact, Sheri Rosenberg and Everita Silina have argued that starvation — with its exceedingly slow and dehumanizing form of destruction — deserves special recogni - tion within legal definitions of genocide violence. Another objection to viewing the Holodomor as a case of geno - cide waged by Stalin and other key architects has involved sug - gestions that Soviet leadership accidentally caused the famine, such as through incompetence and bad policies that ushered in unexpected, undesired outcomes. This type of question is com - monly introduced in other contested genocide cases, such as those involving Native American experiences in North America. In such cases, genocide scholarship has guided social scientific approaches by focusing on the intention of the violence, rath - er than centering various methods by which violence can be achieved in such analyses. The political scientist Ernesto Verdeja has argued that assumptions of prior explicit intentionality can be problematic in many well-accepted cases, including Rwanda, Armenia, and the Holocaust — a point that is applicable to oth - er debates regarding whether Stalin sparked or capitalized on existing hunger to achieve his aims. Authoritarian and totalitarian leaders like Joseph Stalin also rare - ly feel the need for unequivocal confessions of genocidal guilt, or even to announce to their subordinates exactly what their ul - timate intentions are. In such cases, social scientists like myself overlay the perpetrators’ capacity to commit violence with their behavior. Drawing from other established genocide research, I
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