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Ilko Borshchak (1892-1959), author of the book Napoleon and Ukraine. From a copy in the Batchinsky Collection, Special Collections, Carleton University Library, Ottawa. off relations with France. We know that during the revolutionary period the French continued to have some knowledge of the aspi rations toward freedom of the various peoples subju gated by Russia for this theme occasionally appeared in the goegraphical and historical literature of the late eighteenth century. Moreover, the French foreign minis ter could consult the archives of his own ministry to find out how such aspirations had once been and could con tinue to be of use to France. With regard to Ukraine, the recently published work of the Alsatian, Jean Benoit Scherer, Annales de la petite Russie (Annals of Little Russia) (1788), which glorified Ukraine during the time of the hetmans and painted a very positive picture of Cossack administration and life, was well known among certain circles. Ukraine was occasionally mentioned directly in the diplomatic correspondence of the revolutionary period. Thus in 1792 the French Foreign Minister, Lebrun, instructed his ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, de Semonville, to urge Turkey against Russia and wrote as follows: “Monsieur de Semonville is to explain to the Grand Vizier [of Turkey] the various difficulties which Russia finds itself in, and in particular the bad state of its finances, the existence of various groups which are ready to divide this empire among themselves, and also, the possibility of uprisings in Ukraine, in the Kuban, and in Georgia against the Russian government.” In further letters, reference is made to “the Cossack nation which is accustomed to liberty and must impatiently bear Rus sian slavery.” The French were unable to incite the Ukrainian Cossacks or most subjected peoples against the Rus sian governmant during the revolutionary era but the use of such tactics was not forgotten when Napoleon came to power in 1799. Borshchak claims that Napoleon and his closest advisors harbored a deep distrust, even scorn for the Russians, considering them to be some thing in the way of “northern barbarians”. In 1807, in a speech to the French Senate he directly called them “fanatics and barbarians”. Of course, Napoleon was a practical politician who was always willing to make compromises and to do deals with his enemies if he could see an advantage to it. Thus when he had subdued almost all of western and central Europe, he made peace with Russia at Tilsit (1807) because he thought it convenient. The French Emperor took a similarly practical atti tude towards his potential allies and friends in eastern Europe. Thus Napoleon was quite willing to make extensive use of Polish resentments against Russia, Prussia, and Austria, the powers which had partitioned their country, and recruit many thousands of Polish volunteers into his armies. However, he never made any promises to the Poles of resurrecting their homeland and when he did create a Duchy of Warsaw after the defeat of Prussia, it was a feeble polity under nominal rule of a Saxon king. The Duchy was completely dependent upon France and on the person of Napoleon in particular. We may assume that Napoleon’s attitude towards Ukraine was equally cynical. We know that Napoleon was informed about Ukraine and about Ukrainian dissatisfaction with Russian rule because several books read by the French Emperor contained chapters dealing with Ukraine. Moreover, the French press, which was tightly controlled by the Emperor, occasionally raised the question of Ukrainian or Cossack liberty in its discussions of the current situa tion in Russia. French intrigues against Russia reached a climax in 1811 and 1812. During this period numerous French spies were sent to Russia to gather information and spread propaganda. French agents were specifically sent to Ukraine and later reported back to Paris about widespread dissatisfaction with the Russian regime. These spies sometimes suggested that such dissatisfa ction was so widespread, in fact, that a French raid or diversion in Ukraine could spark a significant uprising against Russian rule. The seriousness of French intentions of using Ukraine against Russia was underlined in a project elaborated by Alexandre Maurice d’Hauterive (17541839), the right hand man of Talleyrand who helped guide pol icy towards Russia. Hauterive proposed to the Emperor the creation of a new Ukrainian state to be composed of the lands of eastern and southern present-day Ukraine; that is, made up of the lands of the former Hetmanate and of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. Such a state, advised Hauterive, with a population unfriendly to Russia and of warlike disposition, could raise an army of some 60,000 ’НАШЕ ЖИТТЯ”, ЛЮТИЙ 1997 15
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